Web Site Blues

“We can’t give up on e-commerce now. The existing site isn’t working for one simple reason: we haven’t gotten past the brochure stage. If we don’t get serious about doing business on-line, our new products won’t sell, and Stocknet’s going to eat our lunch!” Rachel Soltanoff, CEO of TradeRite Software, looked at the message she had just typed, grabbed the mouse, hit “Send Reply,” and then immediately regretted it. “Of course, that won’t help,” she thought. “I need to convince people I’m right, not alienate them.” It had been a mistake to check her e-mail at 11:30 on a Saturday night. The message from Brian Rockart, VP of sales, had been sent Friday night at 9:00; it was clear he thought she’d be away all weekend and didn’t expect her to read it until Monday. His message called the whole basis for her new Web-site strategy into question: “I’m all for doing technical support on-line, and if our customers really need on-line chat capabilities, well, okay,” he had written. “But it’s time to abandon the illusion that we can make money selling through the site, new product or no. We know how our customers like to buy. We know what magazines they read and what trade shows they attend, and we continue to sell our products successfully through those channels. Why do you insist on throwing serious money into a sales-oriented site when it doesn’t produce?” Rachel sighed and pushed her chair back from the desk. She thought for a moment about sending Brian a follow-up message—something more balanced—but decided against it. She needed to talk with Brian and the rest of the senior management team in person. She closed her eyes and tried to focus her thoughts; perhaps if she began at the beginning… Trading on a Hit Created in 1985 by a brilliant programmer, TradeRite started out as a news service for stockbrokers. Rachel had been the company’s first marketing executive; she had wasted no time in suggesting expansion and had asked for a software product that would help customers keep track of their accounts. The software had been a hit, and when the brokerage market boomed in the late 1980s, Rachel became CEO, freeing the founder to concentrate on his new love, writing software to help guide his sailboat. By 1995, she had grown the company to $ 70 million in sales. But even as the company grew, the brokerage software business became very competitive. And so Rachel took the company in a new direction. She had her best programmers create a special software package aimed at the small but growing market of day traders—individuals trading on-line for their own accounts who try to reap profits daily, buying or shorting a stock for a few hours at a time, rarely holding a position overnight. This new breed of trader—which topped 7 million by 1998—needed lots of real-time information. TradeRite’s products gave them a single screen where they could get market data, buy and sell stocks, track positions, and so on. She hired Brian Rockart, an executive vice president of sales for a multinational consumer-goods company, to sell the new product. Her bet paid off—TradeRite captured high ground in a market that took off big time, taking the value of the company’s stock with it. Today, the product accounted for 35 % of sales and 58 % of profits. TradeRite held a formidable 46 % of the very profitable and still growing day-trader market. But there was no time to rest. For three months now, she’d known that a new, well-financed start-up—Stocknet.com—was already testing a very competitive Internet-based product. Downloading it directly onto their PCs, day traders would be able to use the product to tap into a network of on-line traders and a wealth of information from all over the Web. They could send one another messages instantly, right on the screen, thus creating a powerful community of day traders. Everyone knew Stocknet posed a serious threat to TradeRite’s position. Lisa Bandini, TradeRite’s product manager, was busy saving the day. She and a team of programmers were working overtime to transform the entire product line into Web-aware applications that would enable users to communicate with one another in real time and get news from any source on the Internet, essentially matching Stocknet’s offering. TradeRite wouldn’t get to market first, but with its large installed base, it wouldn’t have to build credibility either. If everyone at TradeRite worked hard, they’d lose the first stage but still win the race. Rachel was well aware, however, that she had to launch these products right the first time—there wouldn’t be a second chance. That’s why selling through the Web had become such a critical—and controversial—idea. Until now, TradeRite had not sold its products on-line. If selling over the Web was going to be a big part of the new product launch—as Rachel believed it should be—then they all had their work cut out for them. It wasn’t that the company was a stranger to the Web. TradeRite’s first Web site, built in 1995, had been a mild success. It offered on-line technical support and upgrades, along with the standard press releases, company background material, product descriptions, and job postings. While it didn’t win any design awards, the site had been a convenience for some customers and a cost saver for the company. Most of the competition had followed suit. Through e-mail, the company’s customers said they wanted more online contact with TradeRite. So last year, Rachel brought in Marcy Wegman, an Internet-marketing consultant, to revise the site. Rachel said she wanted to sell products directly on-line. To do that, Marcy replied, “you have to be customer focused. You have to speak to each audience individually.” With Rachel’s blessing, Marcy hired a design firm, a writer, and an e-commerce engineering group to put a new site together. The second-generation site offered what Marcy referred to as “solution sets” for different kinds of clients—brokers, mutual-fund managers, and individual traders—and it included a special area for day traders. Each area had information about the software packages that would meet the needs of the target customer group. Unfortunately, the e-commerce consultants were now behind schedule in creating the on-line store capabilities. Worse, their 21-year-old CEO had just resigned, and the firm looked like it was going under. After 12 months and $ 250,000, TradeRite still couldn’t sell on-line. It had a nice looking Web site that told each customer group about an appropriate set of products and then gave out an 800-number to call to place an order. The site was hosted, monitored, and maintained by outside consultants at a cost of $ 2,000 a month. True, more people were visiting the site now than a year ago, but hits weren’t sales and, as far as anyone could see, they weren’t translating into sales from other channels either. E-Stores or BMWs Rachel opened her eyes, sat upright, and turned off her computer. She thought about last Friday’s meeting, which she had called to discuss the new product launch but which had, inevitably, turned into a discussion of the Web site. Marcy Wegman had come to the meeting with a new plan. She said that several big sites and a few startups were now offering e-store capabilities for very little money. TradeRite could hook its existing site to a rented back-end and be selling software online in six weeks. Then, she said, she would spend $ 5 million on banner ads to drive people to TradeRite’s site from the big portal sites. People would filter down to the sales section and put software directly into their electronic shopping carts. Rachel didn’t have $ 5 million to launch her new, Internet-friendly generation of products. She had $ 2.5 million. And she was losing confidence in Marcy, whose only real success had been at a Fortune 100 company that had great name recognition to start with. Brian was the guy holding the most cards. It was his budget, and he was a gifted salesman who’d been crucial to TradeRite’s success. “Listen,” he said, “we’ve wasted too much time and energy on a Web site that isn’t working. I’m not giving Marcy any more of my budget. You hired me to get results—I’m going to give you results. I’m going to bring on three more salespeople and cover the magazines with a new ad campaign directed at day traders. To meet potential customers face to face, I’m going to hold a series of mock trading events with prizes—BMW Z3s—for the traders who do the best with a given amount of play money. Because a lot of our new customers are older baby boomers and retired people, we’re going to make our marketing materials easy to read. And we’ve got a group in Dallas who will produce an infomercial that we can send out on videotape. I’ll have the ad agency realign the Web site to go with the new product brochures. I see no reason to risk any more money on an Internet sales strategy.” Brian knew how to sell, but he really didn’t “get” the Internet. Rachel had once asked him to name some Internet stock-trading sites, and he couldn’t come up with a single one. He saw the Web merely as a place to put up product specifications. But Rachel knew that people over 50 were not only the second-biggest group getting into day trading, they were also actively going on-line. Marketing vice president Rob Collins, just back from a conference in Singapore, agreed with Brian. “We already own the day-trader market. It’s profitable, but it’s not loyal. In a couple of years, this market could go away entirely. Our biggest opportunities lie with our brokerage customers, who are just now getting onto the Internet. We can get ahead of our traditional competitors by renewing our commitment to traditional brokers. We need to add more value, that’s all. We should give full-service brokers the on-line tools they need to be more efficient in serving their customers. Why are we investing so much to give day traders something they will sooner or later get for free at Yahoo!? We should be trying to make our biggest revenue products more profitable rather than our most profitable products bigger.” Product manager Lisa Bandini was, as usual, outspoken in her reply. “Look, if we focus on our top ten customers, we’ll be living in the past and alienating prospects. The future’s with on-line trading, not with traditional brokerage firms. Brian wants to use the ad agency to rework the Web site? Good lord, they can’t even make a decent Web site for themselves, let alone for us. If Rob and Brian call the shots, they’ll be wondering what happened when Stocknet goes public. Did you know Cisco Systems did $ 100 million in business last year with one customer entirely over the Internet? We need to get this site working. By the time the traditional brokerage houses know what hit them, most of their customers will be trading for their own accounts and doing it online. That’s the software we need to develop, and we’ll need to partner with the on-line e-brokers to do it.” “How much would it really cost to develop our own Web store and do our marketing on-line?” Rachel asked Marcy. Joe Martinez had been waiting for that question. Joe was a no-nonsense CTO who hated to waste his people’s time. “It’s not as easy as Marcy makes it sound,” he said. “Even if we started selling on-line, even if we drove a lot of people to the site, we don’t know how to measure the effectiveness of something like this. If our customers really want to buy TradeRite products on-line, we need to establish relationships with them and do more than just charge their credit cards. I’m not going to commit resources for a Web project until we can prove its effectiveness. We should start with a pilot project to show that an on-line approach will generate results. Then we’ll be able to more rationally take it to the next level.” A Cure for Insomnia? It was 1:30 a.m. Rachel forced herself to leave her office and head upstairs. More work now would only lead to insomnia, she knew. She would do some homework on the Web tomorrow and somehow come up with a convincing argument for the troops on Monday. How should Rachel relaunch her upgraded, Internet-friendly product line? What role should the Web site play? David Siegel is a professional speaker and president of Siegel Vision, a strategic Internet-consulting firm based in San Francisco, California. He is the author of Secrets of Successful Web Sites (Hayden Books, 1997). Rachel Soltanoff has guided the company successfully by taking chances and keeping ahead of her competitors in pursuing new markets. Her success, however, is now her worst enemy. The pressure to maintain earnings and the entrenched beliefs of some of her people are making it difficult for her to steer clear of the iceberg ahead. Moreover, the cultural shift she faces is bigger than the technical and marketing challenges combined. For TradeRite, the currents are changing. The brokerage market has crested; the trend toward on-line trading is rising. By rededicating her company to its institutional customers, Rachel will head for the rocks. She might sustain revenues, maybe even increase earnings in the short term. But in a few years, she’ll be sitting on top of the mast of a sinking ship. Rachel should do everything she can to make those insatiable day traders happy. TradeRite isn’t a start-up, but to stay competitive it needs to think like one. The company’s foothold in the day-trading market is now its most important asset. The company should embrace this group as its primary customer base. It should do everything it can to make these insatiable people happy, even though the strategy carries some risk and will likely cause revenues to dip temporarily. I would counsel Rachel to take three steps: First, embrace the Internet culture. Everyone at TradeRite must learn to use the Web every day. Rachel should send her employees to Internet “boot camp,” where they will go through drills on how to find news, conduct research, join discussion groups, sign up for mailing lists, buy software, keep up with competitors, do business, and so on. The employees should build their own personal pages and a communal intranet, complete with a directory of on-line resources. People who build their own intranets tend to use them more. Rachel and the people who “get it” should work with Brian and any other “off-liners” to find ways to communicate with customers via the Internet. Rachel should insist that upper management learn to surf and use the Web daily. Rachel should let Web consultant Marcy Wegman go; she needs to learn about the Web firsthand. She should identify several Web sites that offer advice and chat rooms for day traders, then buy the biggest one she can afford. She can use that site to develop lists of existing customers, get feedback from potential customers, and help launch the new product. That will get the company going in the right direction, bring in fresh blood, and alert the competition that TradeRite isn’t going down without a fight. Second, bring the Internet into TradeRite’s products. The Internet must be central to the company’s new product development. Rachel should establish a committee of dedicated customers to help the company design creative features into products for day traders. She should send Brian Rockart to the traditional brokers to ask them how they would want the Internet to fit into their daily routines. Joe Martinez and his technical group could license TradeRite’s technology to on-line brokers, which would help build awareness of its offerings among the brokers’ customers. Using Java, they could build software that traders could download from the Web to, for example, create customized charts and make comparisons among various sources of data. By opening strong channels of communication between customers and programmers, Rachel will send a clear message: everyone in the company should be looking for the next big thing on-line traders will want. For example, new on-line investment banks like Wit Capital are setting up zero-commission markets. Could TradeRite create something for traders in those markets that might become a huge hit? Rachel should also think about turning products into services, offering server-based software subscriptions to people who would rather not maintain their own software. Third, create a Web site that listens. Rachel needs a Web site that can do business with each customer group on its own terms. The site should offer services and add-ons in response to customer feedback. Rather than go through traditional marketing channels, marketing VP Rob Collins could tap into the day-trader sites by buying banner ads, negotiating deals for hot links, and holding events on-line at TradeRite’s site. Brian’s day-trading contest is a fine idea, but it should take place on a special Web page, followed by a live awards ceremony. That should attract plenty of free press and steal Stocknet’s thunder. Listening to customers over the Web will also allow Rachel to confirm the fact that retired people are day trading and that no site caters to them specifically. She should hire some of these people as special consultants and commission them to set up a community for their peers. Gathering the comments and responses of the senior day traders will allow TradeRite to develop a special version of its software just for them (one that, for example, takes into account the fact that not only their eyesight but also their tax situations are different from those of younger traders). At this point, it should be very clear to Rachel that she won’t be able to save the company by focusing on core values, as Jim Collins advocates in Built to Last. For many companies, moving to the Internet is a survival strategy, not Collins’s Big Hairy Audacious Goal. Rachel has no choice but to set sail and let the winds blow where they may. By using the Internet to listen to new customers, TradeRite will be a bigger and more profitable company in the long run. Candice Carpenter is a founder and the chief executive officer of iVillage, a Web site for women. TradeRite has to become an Internet-based business, fast. That’s the bottom line. It has 46 % of the fastest growing, most Internet-savvy trader market—day traders—and it just can’t afford to lose that share. TradeRite can’t give Stocknet more of a lead than it already has. Sure, Rachel Soltanoff hired a poor consultant. We’ve all done that. Most people on the Net have had more than one false start. You just have to overcome it and eventually get it right. Sure, Rachel hired a poor consultant. We’ve all done that. Most people on the Net have had more than one false start. There seem to be some problems within the company that are making it hard to move forward. I’d suggest several ways to resolve them. If people at TradeRite are blocking things internally, it’s going to be difficult to move quickly, and the problem has to be addressed soon. Internet start-ups like Stocknet—the “dot com” companies—go from being annoying competitors to being extremely annoying (and formidable) competitors very quickly. I would give my senior people—Brian Rockart in particular—a very firm directive: “The Web is happening, and you have three or four months to get with the program.” I’d force the senior people to go on-line themselves. Once people get on the Internet, they have a better perspective: both the intimidation and the ignorance tend to melt away. I would give my senior people a very firm directive: “The Web is happening, and you have three or four months to get with the program.” It makes sense to bring more of the Web site development inside so that the technology people will own it and be motivated to make it work. The company will need to hire a couple of people with Web experience for the tech group and make them part of a guerrilla force given separate funds and direct access to the senior executives. Outsourcers may end up building the site itself, but if you outsource everything—the design and the strategy too—from day one, you never really understand what the site is doing for your company, and that’s too risky. Rachel and her team should think about an acquisition, too. They probably can’t acquire Stocknet because it’s already too pricey. Usually by the time a company like TradeRite wakes up, it’s too late to acquire an up-and-coming competitor because valuations of Internet stocks are so insanely high. However, if there’s another on-line company that’s in exactly the same business—one that’s not as far along as Stocknet—it would be a good buy. Rachel could let the acquisition act like another guerrilla group inside TradeRite. That would be faster than changing the culture. The other thing Rachel could do is find on-line partners that reach TradeRite’s target customers. A lot of companies are linking up with iVillage in this way, actually. Charles Schwab, for example, has an investor center on our site: people can start a transaction from our site without switching over to Schwab’s. TradeRite should think about forming relationships with financial sites that have fostered very strong communities—Motley Fool comes to mind—and work with them for, say, a year. Those savvy sites can build features right into TradeRite’s site. That’s one way to avoid having to jump in all the way—building a community, maintaining the site, and figuring out a strategy all at the same time. That’s a great deal to do when you’re learning, and you risk wasting money. In looking for on-line partners, Rachel should stay away from portals like Yahoo! or Excite because TradeRite’s products and services are so specialized. The portals deliver a mass audience, so the smart money has moved away from using them to reach a niche. It’s easier to make deals with specialized sites anyway. Rachel has got to say, “This is our strategy, and we’re going to do whatever it takes to succeed.” If she’s not clear about that, her staff will think “we should exit” every time they hit a bump. And you hit a lot of bumps on the Internet. TradeRite is going to go down some paths that won’t pay off, and it will go down some that do. The most important thing is to try lots of approaches. Rachel needs to be willing to spend some money on this—most likely at least $ 2.5 million in the first year, and probably much more than that in the next two years. Remember, there are competitors ahead of TradeRite on the Internet. Any less than that really won’t get the company very far. The main thing is to get started. Rachel needs to realize that she’s going to make mistakes: she needs to give the hard parts to someone who’s politically bullet proof, and she needs to get everyone else out of the way. And don’t think that going on the Web is just an option. It’s a requirement. David Ticoll is president of Alliance for Converging Technologies, a research and consulting firm in Toronto, Ontario, focused on strategies for electronic business. He is the coeditor of Blueprint to the Digital Economy (McGraw-Hill, 1998). The retail brokerage market can be separated into four main segments. First are traditional high-cost, full-service brokers like Goldman Sachs. Then there are pure on-line brokers like E*Trade. Third are companies that are hybrids of on-line and personal service like Charles Schwab, whose fees are much lower than those of full-service brokers but higher than those of discounters like E*Trade. And, finally, there’s an even newer breed of firm, like Broadway Trading, that provides electronic day traders with nearly direct, real-time access to the markets. These latter companies are sometimes referred to as “electronic communication networks.” ECNs are replacing the foyers of full-service brokerage houses where day traders have hung out for 200 years. By now, the market trend is clear: upwards of 25 % of retail trades in the United States are already being conducted by individuals using Internet-based on-line brokers. What’s driving this dramatic change? First, investors in general—and day traders in particular—want more control and are only too willing to be freed from the clutches of so-called full-service brokers (an oxymoron). Second, on-line brokers and ECNs are aggregating and delivering the information and software tools that retail investors and day traders need to make informed investment decisions. As a result of these drivers, on-line trading has become far more effective for many people than traditional approaches to personal portfolio management. Retail customers are stampeding to pure on-line and hybrid brokerage services. In addition, many people are quitting their “day jobs” to become day traders. As the number of on-line retail customers and day traders grows, the total pie grows too. An unintended consequence: institutional investors are losing influence as day traders and ordinary on-line retail customers exert more influence over market trends. The growing power of these “nerd herds” is leading to increased market volatility. Day traders and the companies that support them are beginning to enjoy access to powerful new technologies, such as wireless communications and “smart” analytic and portfolio-management tools. Rachel Soltanoff is no doubt taking such tools into account in her product development plans. But if she isn’t, she’ll have to change plans quickly or devise a graceful exit from the market. Assuming that TradeRite is covering its bases in product development, what should its marketing plan be? First, Rachel should forget about full-service brokers. Very few day traders will stay with those companies; most have already moved out on their own. Rachel ought to forget about full-service brokers. Very few day traders will stay with those companies; most have already moved on. Next, Rachel should split the capabilities of TradeRite’s day-trader software into two sets of products. One set should deliver electronic functions that specialized electronic brokers like the ECNs will buy from TradeRite and then deliver to their own day-trader customers as part of their core service offering. Such products would aggregate and deliver information on stocks and companies and let traders communicate with one another through on-line communities. TradeRite needs to offer a product that is better, more innovative, and cheaper than anything an ECN or on-line broker could develop in-house. As this young market continues to expand, many new players will enter the game; they will be delighted to have access to an off-the-shelf product that lets them get into business easily and quickly. The second set of products should target individual day traders. It should include tools for personal portfolio management, analysis, and forecasting. To the extent that these products have features that plug into the software TradeRite is building for on-line brokers, they will be more attractive to individual customers. Versions should be available not only for personal computers but also for palmtops and for wireless devices. If TradeRite really does it right—offering two seamless, complementary product suites—it could lock in big chunks of its two target markets. TradeRite’s software for day traders and other individual investors should be sold primarily through four electronic channels: on-line and hybrid brokers; ECNs; independent software retailers on the Web; and TradeRite’s own site. That site should have reciprocal hot links to the biggest and best on-line brokers and software retailers. In addition to selling products directly to customers, TradeRite’s site should provide upgrades, service, and support, including customer-to-customer support. Carrying out this plan will take more than the $ 2.5 million Rachel has in her kitty. It looks like it might be time for another round of venture capital investment. Jeffrey F. Rayport is an associate professor at Harvard Business School in Boston, Massachusetts. Smart solutions in business seldom begin with form over substance. But here there’s one obvious first move. CEO Rachel Soltanoff should change the company’s name to reflect the market’s new realities. TradeRite Software should become TradeRite.com. There’s no better way for her to signal both internally and externally that, in this business, the Internet has changed everything. This isn’t about hype—even though the name change will lift the company’s stock price. Rather, it’s about communicating to management that for TradeRite to survive, the company’s approach to products, people, and technology all must change. And because she’s doing business on Internet time, Rachel has no time to lose. Let’s start with products. TradeRite began by selling software in shrink-wrapped boxes. When the company was founded in 1985, that made sense. It was not until the early 1990s that companies such as Oracle and Microsoft led the way by shipping products over the Internet. Today, software is sold in far fewer bricks-and-mortar stores. Egghead no longer operates physical retail stores—last year, it moved entirely to the Web. Egghead’s executives believe that people who are serious about software will browse on-line regardless of whether they receive the product physically or digitally. TradeRite is misguided in using its Web site merely for sales promotion. But there’s a more important reason to redefine TradeRite’s distribution channels. Proponents of the network computer like to say, “The network is the computer.” Their point is that PCs are unnecessary when the network itself can provide most of the memory and intelligence of a stand-alone machine. Five years ago, to use eSchwab or Fidelity On-Line, account holders had to order software, install it on their hard drives, and then dial in to the company’s servers. Today, users simply visit a Web site, where everything from personal account information to analytical applications is accessible with no more software than a browser. As a result, Rachel must recognize—and fast—that her product has become a service. TradeRite’s traditional brokerage customers may deliver revenue for years to come, but that’s not where the growth is. It’s in the mass market of aging baby boomers who are starting to trade on-line. If TradeRite doesn’t offer the services that those day traders demand—and they already account for one-third of the company’s sales and nearly two-thirds of its profits—TradeRite will quickly become, as Rachel surely fears, roadkill on the information highway. Rachel must recognize—and fast—that her product has become a service. This leads to the second problem Rachel faces, which is people—specifically, her direct reports. Three of them are problematic. TradeRite’s CTO, Joe Martinez, should be leading the company’s Internet efforts. Instead, he’s a legacy from the mainframe era. He’s more interested in protecting his people than in working with them to save the company. And he’s a seriously misguided thinker. Who has time on the Internet for a pilot project? The market is the pilot. Who in e-commerce worries about measuring effectiveness? Real-time business results are the only measure of effectiveness. Who wants to observe the pilot for a few months and then “more rationally take it to the next level”? E-commerce businesses evolve and improve through live interactions with customers. Anyone who’s still talking this way in 1999 should be fired on principle. Good-bye, Joe. Next, TradeRite’s marketing chief, Rob Collins. During a crisis, he’s been attending a conference in Singapore. For regulatory reasons, it’s unlikely the company does business outside the United States. Singapore is a long way from headquarters. This looks like a poorly timed, possibly irrelevant, and very expensive junket. Good-bye, Rob. Finally, sales VP Brian Rockart. Rachel has already conceded that Brian doesn’t “get” the Internet. But he brings in most of the revenue, so she must find a way to work with him in the near term. His idea about hosting mock trading competitions for customers at trade shows is a nonstarter because TradeRite’s future customers won’t be there. Trade shows are for business buyers like TradeRite’s brokerage customers. Trouble is, those buyers are dinosaurs. Growth is coming from baby boomers going on-line, and Brian plans to reach them only by printing brochures with larger type! He’s playing a hardware game in a software world. If he doesn’t retrofit himself in a hurry, it’s good-bye, Brian. Problem number three concerns technology. Outsourcing the company’s Internet strategy to a consultant with no track record and no client portfolio is a dubious decision in itself. But outsourcing the development of the technology that represents the company’s future—the transaction-processing systems and e-commerce engines—is a more serious mistake. And consultant Marcy Wegman has committed the classic sin of Web site development: she’s focused on hits, not on real business results. No wonder all she’s produced to date is “brochureware.” TradeRite has one saving grace: product manager Lisa Bandini. Lisa has her priorities straight. For one thing, she’s actually working hard to fix the problem. For another, she understands how the Internet is changing the industry’s structure and what the implications are for TradeRite. She also knows that Stocknet could launch an IPO and amass capital that would really put TradeRite on the defensive—in short, it could do to TradeRite what Amazon.com is currently doing to Barnes & Noble. So change the name now to TradeRite.com. Assemble a team, with Lisa at the helm. And quickly embrace the future. The future for TradeRite is now, and Rachel does not have a split second of Internet time to lose.

Web Site Blues

Partner Center